The most extensively developed research agenda in sociology is probably status attainment. It was initiated by Blau and Duncan's (1967) research exemplar. That rich volume has many facets, but this paper centers on a seminal feature: the path analytic representation of the socioeconomic life cycle.
I will propose three related novelties that constitute an alternative approach. The first is a statistical technique for extracting indices of status continuity from a correlation matrix. The new tool condenses the information into a minimalist pattern, such that the rules of path analysis generate a causal chain where each stage depends solely on its immediate predecessor. This structure should aid comprehension and communication.
Second, I will propose a reconceptualization of the central problem in terms of "the life chance perspective." The life cycle stages of status attainment are taken as sites for the measurement of life chances. Life chances are thus conceptualized as a probability distribution over possible outcomes. These have a prospective component, namely expected outcomes, and a probabilistic component capturing the uncertainty that separates expectation and final fate.
Life chances order a population or cohort from most advantaged to least. At each life cycle stage there is a distinct ranking. Passage between life cycle stages reshuffles ranks. Change in life chances is social mobility. The amount of change is assessed by correlating life chances before and after the reshuffling process. (Strictly, the correlation measures immobility.) The numerical core of the "life chance perspective" is a sequence of correlations describing the continuity of rank. Each succession is associated with a definite quantity of reshuffling of rank, or social mobility.
Third, application of the life chance perspective to Blau and Duncan's data, and other data from that seminal period, will reveal striking immobility across the key transitions of educational completion and labor market entry. This reinterpretation is partly subjective, insofar as there is no widely shared standard for how large a correlation must be to merit an adjective like "striking."
It is therefore helpful to ground the interpretive issue in an apparent contradiction in findings. On the one side is "status attainment," for which Blau and Duncan's work is the paradigmatic exemplar. On the other is Paul Willis's (1977) insightful ethnography, Learning to Labor.
Willis's work does not directly confront the findings or interpretations found under the status attainment rubric. But it appears to be inconsistent with those results. His ethnogra-phy appears to suffer from a characteristic vice, namely, the acceptance (and uncritical transmission) of a small sample of members' accounts as if they faithfully reflected largescale structural forces.
Willis's subjects, "the lads," were British working class youth disenchanted with academic striving. They believed that effort at school was useless, because their early adult life chances were largely fixed. They believed that people like themselves were confined to a narrow range of outcomes and that what they did (or did not do) in school would make little difference.
These beliefs seem to deny or contradict status attainment results. First, completed education is substantially decoupled from social background, so that working-class origins would be only a modest barrier. Second, labor market entry is further decoupled. Eventual occupational attainment was even more so. Therefore, mobility was far from impossible. Even if one grants the accuracy of Willis's report of "the lads" views, their folk beliefs appear to be unduly cynical. And if "the lads" are mistaken in viewing their early adult life chances, and those of their classmates, as already fixed by midadolescence, then Willis's larger interpretation based on the validity of those beliefs must be called into question.
And thus I will pose the issue. Should "the lads" (or at least Professor Willis) be required to read Blau and Duncan (or Inequality [1972] or Hope's [1984] British, Scottish, American comparison As Others See Us) to restore their faith in the enormous mobility chances of industrial society? Who was closer to the mark, Blau and Duncan or"the lads"?' I will outline a new approach to such issues in five sections. First, I will characterize and critique the image of mobility chances that was implicit in Blau and Duncan. Second, I will motivate the "life chance perspective" as an alternative way to interrogate the same 1 Folk observers generally have access only to small samples of people similar to themselves. An implicit issue motivating this paper is whether such samples should show reliable traces of the intersection of structure and biography, or whether lay interpretations are almost certain to depart from large sample findings. Ultimately this bears on a central motivating assumption of mobility research, that patterns and perceptions of opportunity shape sentiments toward inequality. data. The third section will present empirical examples to make the contrasts of the two approaches concrete. The fourth section will suggest speculative applications, or thought experiments that are facilitated by the simplicity of the new approach. The fifth section will explore differences in interpretation between the two approaches.
THE MANIFOLD MOBILITY OF MULTIPLE CAUSES
The heart of the opposition between Willis and Blau and Duncan is the issue of mobility versus constraint or fluidity versus determinism. Blau and Duncan did not directly address the issue but it is closely intertwined with two of their major objectives. One goal was to assess the relative impact of achievement versus ascription. They further sought to untangle the magnitude of constraint operative at different life cycle stages. As they put it,
The questions we are continually raising in one form or another are: how and to what degree do the circumstances of birth condition subsequent status? and, how does the status attained (whether by ascription or achievement) at one stage of the life cycle affect the prospects for a subsequent stage? (1967, p. 164) A concealed choice anchors this agenda. Blau and Duncan's summary suggests that a key question is the amount of change in status as life cycle stages succeed one another. The amount of status change for a population or cohort is the amount of social mobility. Therefore, it might seem that a measure of the amount of mobility that accompanies each new stage would be central. But they undertook a different line of attack.
Without explicitly marking the shift, Blau and Duncan replaced the singular concept of "status" with a plural concept of the succession of "statuses." Successive ranks are along distinct, different dimensions. But transitions like education to first job combine quantitative change in rank with a confounding qualitative chance to a different criterion of rank. Consequently, "mobility" becomes a compound of vertical movement and alignment along a different metric of differentiation. In effect, the starting concern with mobility was abandoned, and in its place the causal relations among qualitatively distinct rankings were analyzed. This choice has a critical consequence. The message accumulates from several empirical circumstances that are ubiquitous across this research genre. First, the zeroorder correlations are not very large, even while they are far from negligible. Second, the more sophisticated and refined "direct effects" are still smaller,4 as are the enlarging 2 Later analyses adopted the approach of structural equations where "cause" is quantified in the metric of the several dimensions. This is parallel with directing attention to relations among qualitatively different dimensions, and it highlights the qualitative differences that mark the succession of stages.
3 Of course, race was prominently featured as an ascriptive defect in The American Occupational Structure. But the standard of comparison was the more favorable pattern for whites, so that even this exception tended to sustain the opposite implication for the bulk of the population. 4 Of course, this pattern depends on measured magnitudes and is not logically inevitable. At the same time it is commonly observed and therefore somewhat independent of the empirical problem at hand. Presumably, this applies to Willis's respondents. They are, on the standard interpretation, mistaken if they believe that their fathers' bottom-tier jobs will strongly determine their educational outcomes. Their labor market entry points are still further decoupled, and their ultimate outcomes are yet further removed. On the standard interpretation it follows that they cannot accurately anticipate immobility that would empirically justify their fatalism. But this judgment is premature. It must be tempered by attaching quantities to the amounts of mobility implied by the sample survey results of which "the lads" were presumably ignorant. Every incomplete biography is like a growing dossier of information that bears on social rank. The prospects or average chances associated with each dossier is the average or predicted outcome for that record. To capture predictability, one can imagine an array of persons in rank order of ultimate outcomes. Empirically, this ranking can be taken as eventual occupational attainment, although in principle one could employ any measure of differential life satisfactions that are socially structured.6 This measure of final results I call the individuals' fates.
THE LIFE CHANCE PERSPECTIVE
Regression provides a tool for measuring prospects as they unfold toward fate. Fate, as a vector of scores or ranks, can be regressed on a set of measures, for example, the various ranks characterizing family of origin. Application of the regression weights or coefficients to the background variables yields a score for each youngster that is the best predictor of eventual fate. I call this score a measure of the youngster's life chances. 6 The strict requirement is that one could use any one dimensional summary. Occupational SEI is adopted here for the sake of comparison with the vast body of work based on this measure. 5This distributional concept of life chances is less ambitious than Dahrendorf's broader conception that included collective goods, such as civil liberties or an orderly social environment, in addition to private goods. For present purposes, I restrict the concept to relative position or ranks, which endows differential life chances with overtones of zero-sum competition among individuals. The anti-utopian bias that results is a common and probably unavoidable consequence of a focus on individual mobility. This ranking score is the predicted value of the individual's fate. Arithmetically, it is a weighted linear combination of the individual's status attributes. The weights are the regression coefficients when fate is regressed on the set of predictors. Conceptually, it measures differential expectations.
Differential expectations are both present advantages and "mere" chances subject to revision. Those with high expectations will, on average, get better outcomes. But expectations are merely the predictable part of personal choices and decisions by power holders. Some with lesser expectations will pull ahead of some who had greater, as deviant decisions and unpredicted outcomes accumulate into changes in rank. Life chances are subject to modification as probabilities give way to certainties.
Most strictly, the aggregate of persons sharing a given rank have shared chances. Life chances refers to their total distribution of probabilities over outcomes. This is not directly measurable (at reasonable cost) but can be summarized by the mean and variance of the outcomes they will experience. The mean is the average or expected outcome, which corresponds to the "predicted" value of the regression summary. The variance corresponds to the error or residual variance of the regression. Life chances are a mixture of expectation and variance. People with identical life chances do not enjoy identical outcomes.
The dispersion of subpopulations from common expectations to divergent fates is the unfolding of life chances. As cohorts advance through restratifying processes, like education, some move up and some move down. But each new ranking is predictable in definite degree from its predecessor. Insofar as the new rank is predictable, no mobility has occurred. And each new ranking can be calculated in parallel by regressing fate on current facts. So the new ranking after, say, reshuffling due to education is based on a new regression with education added to family of origins measures.
Unfolding can also be viewed by looking back from adult rank. In the immediate past, last year's occupational-rank must be a nearly perfect predictor of this year's. Stepping back in time, the prediction weakens steadily. Far enough back, at labor market entry, occupational rank winks out of existence, but a foreshadow of adult rank based on education and other factors can be calculated. Ultimately, one could unfold the process all the way back to rank based solely on family of origin. Each ranking could be resolved into little categories like percentiles. And then the movement of a cohort through the life cycle could be viewed as myriad trajectories or flows where occupants of each percentile disperse upward, sideways, and downward into the succeeding set of boxes.7 And, of course, associated with such transitions are the various choices by individuals and by gatekeepers that move some ahead and others behind.
A measure of the immobility associated with the change in the ranking of persons is the correlation between successive rankings. No mobility has occurred if prospects or life chances are predictable from previous prospects. This is equivalent to saying that one's rank was unaltered by the new information or score on the most recent dimension. Conversely, mobility or changes in life chances is measured by the residual that is the complement to the correlation.
Thus the perspective leads, first, to a comparative ranking across the sample for each life cycle stage. Infants, teens, young adults, and so forth can each be stratified on the basis of the applicable variables. In principle, one can regard successive studies as refinements converging toward an upper bound of predictability based on all information about persons of a given maturity. In practice, attention is confined to the variables available within a study.8 Second, the transition between stages is identified with a definite degree of stability and reshuffling or immobility and mobility.9 Some transitions, 7 In continuous form, this can be identified with a Gaussian random walk. The present paper is an approximate operationalization of this concept, which was my original starting point. 8 There is no restriction against categorical predictors. And there is no requirement that every sample member have values on all variables. The possibility mentioned in the text of employing full information is not entirely theoretical.
9 In general, scores used for ranks are "continuous" linear combinations of "continuous" measures. Ordinary product moment correlations are employed. (One could examine the metric variant, but the resulting coefficients are identically equal to 1.0 and carry no information.) So the scores are ranks only insofar as they refer to placement along an abstract dimension of expectations.
like college admission against a backdrop of high school performance, presumably would show high predictability. Predictability means that the new positions are ratifications or continuations of previous rank. More significant watersheds, like the reshuffling imposed by gatekeepers at labor market entry, should lead to lower correlations. In the latter case, the empirical analysis will soon provide a definite magnitude for inspection.
Associating a definite ranking with each stage of the life cycle makes it possible to assess the degree of change of rank, or social mobility, associated with each life cycle transition. "How much mobility" is not directly apparent from status attainment statistics. Instead, these address a variety of questions of dependence/independence among qualitatively varied factors. In effect, the dependence of any factor, like education, reflects immobility with respect to that axis of differentiation. However, the importance of the particular axis in the larger picture is empirically contingent. The result is something akin to "how much mobility" that on close analysis must be doubly qualified, once because the mobility is with respect to a particular dimension, and again to incorporate how much that dimension matters for other things.
The life chance perspective addresses a different question: how much any factor like education reshuffles the rank order of predictable access to the goodies. Such ranks summarize the chances associated with the cumulative statuses and outcomes of one's life to date. As the empirical material will show, the predictability of global rank generally exceeds, often by a wide margin, the predictability of the contributing components.
Thus the life chance perspective is an alternative to examination of the causal relations among variables. Attention is directed to the degree to which accumulating information (about stratifying outcomes and decisions) alters the ranking of individuals as expectations converge toward fate. With these tools, one can directly examine the amounts of mobility associated with the transitions captured by any sequence of empirical measures along the life cycle.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
The relation of rankings at different stages in the life cycle is summarized by the correlations of the successive scorings predictive of fate. I call this summary a prediction table since it records the predictability of rank among the several stages of the empirical life cycle under examination. Panel D of Table 1  presents such a table for while the top labels abbreviate LCA (factor) as factor&.
It is straightforward, but tedious, to calculate the correlations among the LCA variables using the actual weights that describe the successive measures of life chances. Appendix A justifies a shortcut. The life chance correlations are shown to equal the ratios of the multiple correlations for fate on the variables included in each stage. Thus .6902, the correlation between LCA(background) and LCA(education), is the ratio of .4260 and .6172 which are the multiple R for fate on father's occupation and education, and the multiple R for fate on education, and father's occupation and education, respectively. Accordingly, life chances results can often be generated from published reports without recourse to microdata. The results in Table lE In the conventional analyses, mobility is an untidy combination of unexplained variance and variance explained by intervening processes. Immobility, if visible at all, is not a single number but a hodgepodge of inheritance measures across various contributing factors. One source of this ambiguity is the concern for direct and indirect effects. In the influential language of Lazarsfeld, an intervening variable which reduces a causal measure (e.g., a direct path) to zero, "explains" the original relationship. In the first instance, inheritance or immobility is thereby "explained." But the explanatory factors, like education, are frequently measures of individual achievement. Since these must "explain" final outcome, in the sense of incrementing R-square, to perform as intervening variables, these factors also "explain" mobility. The ambiguity arises because effective intervening variables "explain" both mobility and immobility, but in different senses of the verb "explain." As a result, the two complementary concepts become confounded.
13 One could also compare the logically complementary residuals of the correlations, although this requires suitable negations of propositions. The residual variance in education (.738) is 41 percent greater than the residual variance in life chances after education (.524). The percent describes the ratio of the areas of the ellipses that circumscribe "most" of the observations in the corresponding scatter plots. But, in general, it can be misleading to mix comparisons of linear metrics such as correlation with square metrics like variance, just as it can be awkward to compare lengths and areas. In the text, I will restrict attention to correlations. But conditionally independent displacements from current rank offer limited solace to individuals. There is no built-in tendency to cancel extremes of advantage or disadvantage. Future positive and negative displacements around current position will exactly balance at every position. 14 So the provisional or preliminary advantage retained after education is not yet fate; but relative to age peers it is advantage calculated over the only factors that yet exist. In the larger picture, it is a foreshadow subject to modification. In the short term, it is the sum total of the life story to the present.
Labor market entry is a minor lottery, and 14 This claim assumes that the conditional means estimated by the regressions are unbiased, which is similar to assuming that the model is correctly specified. Under this assumption, most individuals lack any objective basis for expecting their future to be more advantaged or disadvantaged than their current rank, even though collectively there will be many modifications. Strictly, this refers only to the information incorporated into the model. If one believed oneself to have a preponderance of unmeasured positive (or negative) qualities, then one could rationally expect favorable (or unfavorable) modifications.
My suspicion is that subjective interpretations of this will turn where one stands in the process. Young persons, whose total rank can be based only on early factors, may be less inclined to discount the extant retention of advantage, because there is no reason to believe that they personally have any prospect of benefiting from later modifications. Older persons, especially those looking down from positions of success, may be considerably more inclined to regard the earlier ranking as permeable to those who, like themselves, possess the requisite unmeasured qualities. presents the sharpest contrast between the two ways of representing the pattern of status continuity. The life chances correlation is .9370. This close coupling with background plus education is quite different from the decoupling suggested by the multiple correlation for first job of only .5749. Although first job is not very predictable, life chances at first job are. On the other side of the coin, the modest reshuffling entailed by first job contrasts with the substantial direct effect of first job on final attainment of .2811. 15 The contrast between the high life chances correlation from educational completion to first job with the much weaker dependence of first job on the prior variables of background and education corresponds to a central novelty of the life chances approach. Appendix B shows that in the limiting case where direct effects of the prior variables on fate are zero, the life chances correlation for any stage with its predecessor will equal the dependence of the variable added at that stage on preceding variables. (Similarly LCA [factor] will be a vector of scores perfectly correlated with factor.) The excess of the life chances correlation over its path analytic counterpart increases as "bypassing" direct effects from prior variables are greater.
What this means, in the current context, is that relative standing or rank at first job depends on more than first job alone. It also depends on education and background. Those with identically ranked first jobs are unequal with respect to final outcome, in the degree that there are differences on prior factors. This means that such differences on prior variables need to be taken into account in assessing mobility. Conversely, the residual variance for first job overstates the fluctuation in rank that accompanies succession into first job. '6 If there were no other direct effects to be accumulated into total rank, one could assess dependence/independence from prior factors by attending to first job alone. The life chances result would converge to the standard result for this special case. More generally, the life chances correlation reflects the weight of direct effects, and shows that the summary ranking after first job is quite similar to the ranking that described expectations for persons completing education. Tables 2 and 3 , derived from Hope's (1984) comparative study of meritelection (his coinage for meritocracy) show interesting similarities and differences with the preceding analysis. Table 2 presents Scottish data. Table 3 
INTERPOLATIONS AND GUESSTIMATES
Magnitudes aside, the conceptual and numerical simplicity of life chances offers additional advantages. The succession of stages is placed in a common framework, and each succession is described by a single, simple correlation. The resulting simple pattern is both rich in implications and easily extended to incorporate new features.
The life chances summary results in a perfect causal chain when subjected to path analysis. As a result, the several paths 17 But it is not completely mysterious. First, many kinds of measurement error cancel (or nearly cancel) when life chance correlations are calculated. Second, adding new indicators to the measures incorporated to a stage increases both the numerator and the denominator of the life chance correlation, leaving the result fairly stable. connecting background to fate are factors whose product is the multiple correlation from background to fate. Thus the paths are a partition.
Interpretively and conceptually, this offers major advantages. Sequences of stages can be combined by simple multiplication. Both the components and the products are correlations, and thus the familiar model of the bivariate normal (Gaussian) distribution can be used to interpolate details for any transition. This is potentially useful in several regards. The correlations linking life cycle stages can be approximately identified with years of age for cohorts. This means that the model places limits, and often very narrow limits, on the expected amount of change over particular intervals. One can quite readily translate these into percentiles, and into other descriptions that can be interpreted as a contest among persons.
Narrow limits can produce sharp implications. If mobility is contextualized in this manner, productive thought experiments become possible. For example, consider the fictitious headline "Harlem youth graduates from Harvard." Can this be regarded as a change from the 10th percentile to the 99th? If the frame is taken as youth from age 16 to age 22, then the governing correlation is higher than .85. The corresponding probability is less than 1 in 20,000,000,000 (z = 6.49, p= 4.29 x e-1).
At those odds, it has probably not happened in the history of the republic. 18 In a somewhat similar fashion, it should 18 The correlation of .85 is below the estimates in Tables 2 and 3 for rank after testing to rank after educational completion. Alternatively, the estimate in Table 1 for family of origin to school completion is .69, and age 16 to 22 must be a small fraction of that. The 10th percentile amounts to a standard deviate of -1.28. The conditional distribution has a mean of -1.09 and a standard deviation of .5267 (= sqrt(1 -.852) ). Thus an outcome in the 99th percentile, or unconditional standard deviate of 2.33, corresponds to a standard deviate of 6.49 (=(2.33-1.09)/.5267) in the conditional distribution. R(2,3) . . + Ln(R (I-1,1) ).
An implication is that interpolation of additional stages is a zero sum analysis. That is, to stick a stage between two extant stages is one-to-one with dividing the corresponding log of the correlation into two pieces that sum to the old total.
An additional intuitive tool is provided by the fact that for correlations that are large -Ln ( The estimates apply to life chances after the variable appearing in the box. They are based on the interpolations discussed in Section IV. Should "the lads" discount this because earlier and later processes also decouple people from origins? The only earlier process recorded in the data is IQ measurement. Willis reports that "the lads" were not overly impressed by the validity of such testing. In any case, their appreciation of their personal chances incorporated the fact that they had already been tested and found wanting. On the other side, they might take comfort in the possibility of later good fortune. But such luck as there might be is independent of schooling outcomes, and thus irrelevant to orientations toward schooling. Furthermore, there are no grounds for anticipating more good luck than bad. So if the "the lads" were attending to their immediate future, or more precisely to the prospects associated with their future 10 years hence, they were essentially correct in their assessment that effort at school would avail them very little.
In some strict sense, such conclusions were implicit in earlier analyses. The prediction table is based on the same empirical base and summarizes the same facts. But the interpretive or subjective difference is substantial. And it is useful to outline the sources of the greater continuity of rank that emerges from the alternative analysis.
The greatest contrast is that the correlations in the prediction tables are large. This, in turn, is connected with the simplicity of the life chances path representation. At the limit, if the standard representation yielded a simple causal chain, then the diagrams from the two approaches would be identical. More generally, the standard representation disperses continuity across a complex tangle of bypassing direct paths. The greater life chances magnitudes correspond to condensing the tangle into simpler, and more striking, indices of status continuity.
Greater simplicity and larger magnitudes recording continuity are therefore empirically contingent. The contingency will usually hold, since perfect "explanation" by intervening variables is more the exception than the rule. The contrast between life chances and conventional causal analysis will be greater as bypassing direct effects are more numerous and are weightier. And since the greater continuity brought out by life chances is contingent on the data, the contrast between the approaches is not one of fact or validity. First job illustrates the contrast. The Blau and Duncan result assigns a complex role as a mediator for both education and background. First job is also a moderately potent precursor for adult occupation. But it is also substantially orthogonal to prior factors. In one sense, this indeterminacy is a species of mobility. But it is misleading. The life chance result brings out the very substantial continuity of rank across labor market entry. This damping of apparent motion occurs because family background and education exert considerable weight on fate over and above first job. For persons, with scores on all dimensions simultaneously, advantage/disadvantage at labor market entry turns on more than first job status, and therefore the volatility of this status overstates the fluidity that would enter a realistic assessment of where one stands.
In sum, life chances does not represent an empirical "refutation" of path analytic results. Such refutation as there may be is conceptual. The difference is one of focus and of motivating question. The greater simplicity and greater continuity of rank is one-to-one with changing the focus to shifts in the relative positions of individuals and away from the interdependencies among variables. Thus a simpler pattern, expressed in the lower-order concept of correlations, emerges from a more central question, to yield results more directly relevant to individuals as wholes. This holds promise for more direct comparison with lay perceptions of changing relative standing. The striking continuity of rank that is revealed may even alter the subjective appreciation of some sophisticated observers.
In a strict sense, the greater continuity of rank revealed by life chances is not novel. It may appear novel because framing the issue differently leads to different answers. But the empirical facts are the same. In principle, one could apprehend the slowly changing ranks of individuals from the various small effects dispersed across paths in the more baroque causal representation. In another sense, the novelty is substantial. By condensing the continuity that was previously splintered among causal effects into singular indices of the continuity of rank, the life chance perspective reveals a picture of considerably reduced fluidity. 
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where e and E refer to unobserved population values. I will use Roman letters (B and e) to refer to sample values. Since the following argument rests on the algebra of OLS estimators, assumptions about the errors would be superfluous.
Assume that all columns are mean centered so that intercepts can be ignored. Assume further that the independent variables are scored so that their zero-order correlation (and hence covariance) with Y is -0. There is no restriction on the correlations among independent variables or the Bs or Ps, so that these can be negative. This directional convention does not sacrifice generality.
The ( so that X2B2 on X, so that alone. Indeed, it would be the same linear combination as LCA (education) and the life chances correlation would be unity. Of course, empirical configurations will generally fall somewhere between, as illustrated by the Blau and Duncan data. The analysis revealed an exception that is more apparent than real. If a factor has a negative direct effect, even though it is positively correlated with fate, and produces "status inversion," it reduces the predictability of life chances. This makes substantive sense since "the first become last and the last become first." As such a pattern is weaker, the life chance correlation is greater, and measured mobility is reduced. Although reduction in "status inversion" is absolute diminution of a direct effect, it is also an increase in the coupling of a factor with fate, and it makes substantive sense to assimilate it to the notion of "increase of direct effect."
In sum, zero direct effects, which means that some variable is a sufficient predictor for eventual outcome, is a limiting case where life chances and conventional path results coincide. But greater direct effects, and more numerous direct effects, increase the life chances correlation in comparison with the degree of determination of the relevant intervening variable. In this sense, the more parsimonious life chances representation is a condensation of the effects which causal analysis disperses across the paths bypassing the intervening factor. The complexity which comes with intervening variables that leave residual direct effects masks the continuity of individual rank.
Simplicity and larger magnitudes indexing continuity go hand in hand.
